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1Abstract
We study collusion in an IPV auction with binary type spaces. Collusion is organized by
a third-party that can manipulate participation decisions. We characterize the optimal
response of the seller to diﬀerent threats of collusion among the bidders. We show that,
contrary to the prevailing view that asymmetric information imposes transaction costs
in side-contracting, collusion in the optimal auction is eﬃcient when the third-party can
implement monetary transfers as well as when it can implement monetary transfers and
reallocations of the good. The threat of non-participation in the auction by a subset of
bidders is crucial in constraining the seller’s proﬁt.
Keywords: Collusion, Third-Party, Optimal Auction.
JEL classiﬁcation: D82.
21 Introduction
The inﬂuence of the auction mechanism on the eﬃciency of collusion has been documented
in a number of empirical works. Baldwin, Marshall and Richard [3] study collusion at
forest service timber sale, for which the mechanism is an ascending auction. They estimate
the loss coming from collusion at 7.9 percent of the expected non-cooperative proﬁt (the
proﬁt that would have been obtained by the seller if there were no collusion). Pesendorfer
[17] tests for collusion in school milk contracts in Florida and Texas. He concludes that in
these ﬁrst-price auctions, colluding agreements are almost eﬃcient in the sense that ﬁrms
bid as if they were a single ﬁrm. Other auction mechanisms are studied in Hendricks and
Porter [9] and Porter and Zona [18]. Each time it appears that the precise mechanism
inﬂuences the losses coming from collusion.
This evidence raises the theoretical question of what the optimal auction mechanism
in the presence of collusion is. The aim of this paper is to tackle such a question. Our
main results state that in an independent and private value auction with binary type
space and two bidders, the seller optimally lets collusion be eﬃcient.1 In the optimal
auction asymmetric information among the set of bidders does not constrain their ability
to collude.
As it is now standard in the literature on collusion, an uninformed third-party that
can enforce side-contracts is introduced to capture in a static model the outcome of a
complex bargaining process among bidders. To take into account the eﬀect of collusion,
the auction procedure is then modeled as a Stackelberg game between the seller who
oﬀers ﬁrst the auction grand-mechanism and the third-party who reacts by oﬀering a
side-contract. In our framework, the side-contract can manipulate participation decisions
in the grand-mechanism and does not vanish if one bidder refuses it.
Two diﬀerent collusion technologies are studied. Under Technology 1, the third-party
can coordinate the bidders’ reports in the grand mechanism and can enforce monetary
transfers among the bidders after the grand-mechanism is played. The situations we have
in mind when studying this technology are, for instance, procurement auctions where the
regulator can verify easily whether production takes place in house or not but cannot
ensure that no money is exchanged. Technology 2 permits collusive quantity transfers
(i.e. reallocations of the good), in addition to monetary transfers and manipulation of the
strategies. It corresponds to standard auctions in which the seller cannot be sure that the
good is consumed by the winning bidder.
When reallocations are not feasible (i.e. under Technology 1), collusion in the opti-
mal mechanism is eﬃcient, meaning that the set of bidders performs as well as if they
1Here and in the folllowing, eﬃciency of collusion concerns the bidders and not the seller.
1behave as a single agent (Theorem 1). The informational asymmetries between bidders
do not constrain their ability to collude. The problem of the seller is thus equivalent to a
monopoly pricing problem; collusion completely destroys competition. If reallocations are
feasible (Technology 2), the same result holds ( Theorem 2). Again, collusion completely
destroys competition. In both situations, imposing transaction costs on side-contracting
is in ﬁne costly to the seller. Because of the threat of non-participation of one or several
buyers into the auction, the seller cannot exploit the informational asymmetries at the
side-contracting stage. From the seller’s point of view, eﬃcient collusion does not have
the same consequences under both technologies. With Technology 1 the maximization
program of the seller is equivalent to that of a multiproduct monopolist 2 (when there
are 2 bidders, there is an analogy between the problem of the 2 possible allocations of
the good that the seller faces and the problem of selling 2 diﬀerent goods by the same
monopolist), while it is equivalent to that of a single product monopolist with Technology
2. Accordingly, the seller’s payoﬀ is higher under Technology 1 than under Technology 2.
Previous theoretical work on collusion in auctions has mostly concentrated on stan-
dard auction mechanisms. It is already known from the work of Graham and Marshall
[8] that collusion is eﬃcient in second-price auctions with independent and identically
distributed private values. For this class of auctions, even if buyers possess a piece of
private information, they collude as if they were symmetrically informed. Mailath and
Zemski [13] extend this result to the case of asymmetric bidders. McAfee and McMillan
[14] proved the same result for ﬁrst-price auctions. Our work extends this to the optimal
auction when monetary transfers are possible as well as when monetary transfers and
quantity reallocations are possible.
The ﬁrst work that studies collusion (in settings with soft information) without re-
stricting attention a priori to a simple class of mechanisms is due to Laﬀont and Martimort
[11, 12]. They provide a useful methodology for an optimal contracting approach to collu-
sion. However, their focus is not on auctions but rather on a regulatory model of duopoly.
In their model, the agents produce complementary inputs and thus, the environment is
not competitive.3 They proved that unless agents’ types are correlated, collusion does not
harm the principal when the third-party cannot manipulate participation decisions. The
principal can cleverly design the monetary transfer schedules to implement the second-best
contract in a collusion-proof way. As we will see, this is no longer true in our competitive
environment (Theorem 1) when participation decisions can be manipulated. The seller
ﬁnds it optimal to let collusion be eﬃcient and cannot implement the second-best.
2See Armstrong and Rochet [1] for a user’s guide of multiproduct monopoly theory.
3Compared to the auction setting where agents ”produce” substitutes, when agents produce comple-
ments, the externality that one exerts on the other goes in the other direction. As the principal will
optimally ask for the same quantity to both agents, when one announces a lower marginal cost, this
increases the quantity to be produced by both.
2More generally, our results on the eﬃciency of collusion in the optimal mechanism
drastically contrast with the prevailing view that agents’ asymmetric information imposes
transaction cost on their abilities to carry out collusive arrangements (see Che and Kim
[5]). They are obtained under the following timing and commitment hypothesis: contrary
to what is generally assumed in the literature on collusion in mechanism design, we
consider that participation in the grand-mechanism occurs after the collusion stage4 and
that the side-contract cannot be vetoed by one agent. Three recent papers consider the
same timing. Mookherjee and Tsumagari [15] compare diﬀerent organizational forms
and prove that centralization subject to collusion is preferred to delegation. However,
they do not provide a complete characterization of the optimal contract when there is
collusion. Pavlov [16] and Che and Kim [6] show that, in some auction situations, the
second-best can be implemented in a collusion-proof way. Two diﬀerences may explain
our diﬀerent conclusion. First, in those papers the model is one with a continuum of
types, while we consider a two-type model. Second and more importantly, their collusion
concept is weaker than ours as they impose the restriction that following a refusal of the
side-contract by one agent, everybody holds passive beliefs and plays the non-cooperative
equilibrium of the grand-mechanism. By contrast, our approach is robust to any kind of
beliefs updating.
Transaction costs (that enhance the seller’s proﬁt) on side-contracting often rely on
manipulation of the reservation utilities that the agents face at the side-contracting stage
(see Celik [4], for instance). In our setting, the threat of non-participation in the grand-
mechanism is strong enough to prevent any proﬁt enhancing manipulation of these outside
options. More precisely, the crucial threat is that of non-participation by one bidder (in
our two-bidder setting). Indeed, the utility that a bidder obtains when the other refuses
the grand-mechanism must be low enough to guarantee that the third-party will not prefer
to ask one bidder to refuse the grand-mechanism (on the equilibrium path) ; it must also
be high enough if P wants to prevent the third-party from achieving eﬃciency because that
utility is an upper bound on the reservation utility of that bidder in the side-contracting
game (the third-party can ask the participating bidder to refuse the grand-mechanism in
case the other bidder refuses the side-contract).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the single-unit
auction model in section 2. Section 3 presents additional constraints imposed by collusion
on the ﬁnal allocation. Section 4 presents our main results on the eﬃciency of collusion
in the optimal auction. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
4Such a timing hypothesis is diﬀerent from the ex ante participation hypothesis (i.e. participation
decision before collusion) made in Laﬀont and Martimort [11, 12], Jeon and Menicucci [10] or Che and
Kim [5] for instance.
32 The model
Consider a seller P facing two potential buyers A1 and A2. P has one unit of a good q to
auction to the buyers. An auction mechanism will allocate a quantity q1 of the good to
buyer A1, a quantity q2 to buyer A2 (with q1+q2 ≤ 1), and realize the monetary transfers
ti from Ai to P. Both buyers have private information about their valuation for the good.
The parameters θi describing buyer i’s valuation can take values in Θ = {θ, ¯ θ} and are
independently and identically distributed with ν = P(θi = ¯ θ). We denote ∆θ = ¯ θ − θ. If
an allocation characterized by a transfer ti and a quantity qi is implemented, buyer i gets
the utility: ui = θiqi − ti, and the seller’s payoﬀ is: π = t1 + t2.
Second-best allocations: To derive the second-best allocation (i.e. the optimal
auction when collusion is not an issue), the revelation principle ensures that we can
restrict our attention to feasible allocations {q(·,·),t(·,·)} with q : Θ1 ×Θ2 → [0,1]2 with
q1 + q2 ≤ 1 and t : Θ1 × Θ2 → R2 that satisfy the following individual incentive and
participation constraints.
Eθ2[¯ θq1(¯ θ,θ2) − t1(¯ θ,θ2)] ≥ Eθ2[¯ θq1(θ,θ2) − t1(θ,θ2)], (1)
Eθ2[θq1(θ,θ2) − t1(θ,θ2)] ≥ Eθ2[θq1(¯ θ,θ2) − t1(¯ θ,θ2)], (2)
Eθ1[¯ θq2(θ1, ¯ θ) − t2(θ1, ¯ θ)] ≥ Eθ1[¯ θq2(θ1,θ) − t2(θ1,θ)], (3)
Eθ1[θq2(θ1,θ) − t2(θ1,θ)] ≥ Eθ1[θq2(θ1, ¯ θ) − t2(θ1, ¯ θ)], (4)
Eθ2[¯ θq1(¯ θ,θ2) − t1(¯ θ,θ2)] ≥ 0, (5)
Eθ2[θq1(θ,θ2) − t1(θ,θ2)] ≥ 0, (6)
Eθ1[¯ θq2(θ1, ¯ θ) − t2(θ1, ¯ θ)] ≥ 0, (7)
Eθ1[θq2(θ1,θ) − t2(θ1,θ)] ≥ 0. (8)
As usual, the binding constraints are the participation constraints of the low valuation
bidders (6) and (8), and the incentive constraints of high valuation bidders (1) and (3).
After replacing into the objective function of the seller, we deduce that he can reason over
individual virtual valuations for the good. The virtual valuation of a θ-bidder is equal to
the true valuation θ, while the virtual valuation of a θ-bidder is distorted downward to
take into account the rent the seller has to give and its value is (θ − ν
1−ν∆θ). Provided
(θ− ν
1−ν∆θ) > 0, the seller chooses to sell the good whatever the state of nature and must
give a global expected rent ν(1−ν)∆θ. The seller’s revenue is then νθ +(1−ν)θ. In the
case (θ − ν
1−ν∆θ) < 0, the seller chooses to sell only to a θ-bidder, he gives no rent and
his revenue is (1 − (1 − ν)2)θ.
Collusion : We assume that collusion is organized by an uninformed and benevolent
third-party T. After P proposes the auction mechanism M, T can propose a manipulation
4side-contract (SC) in order to optimize the ex ante expected sum of the buyers’ utilities.
Three things might be side-contractible: a manipulation φ of the strategies in the auction
mechanism, monetary side-transfers y between the buyers (yi will denote the monetary
transfer received by Ai)and a reallocation of the good k (ki will denote the quantity
transfer or reallocation received by Ai). Technology 1 refers to a form of collusion where
the sole instruments are φ and y. Technology 2 uses φ, y and k. The timing we consider
is the following:
• t =0: The principal announces a grand-mechanism M.
• t =1: The third-party announces a side-contract SC.
• t =2: Bidders play simultaneously in the side-contract.
• t =3: Bidders play simultaneously in the grand-mechanism.
It is important to notice that both buyers decide to participate in M after collusion
is organized. However, once SC is accepted, they are obliged to follow it. For instance,
they cannot refuse to participate in M if they committed in SC to participate in M.
According to this timing, SC can precise the participation decisions of the buyers in
the grand-mechanism. We believe that this timing is quite coherent with real world
practices for auction mechanisms. It is often the case that acceptance or refusal of a
mechanism is a decision that bidders can take after they collude: interim participation is
a natural hypothesis. Second, we assume that the side-contract can specify the actions
to be followed in case both bidders accept the side-contract, but also the actions to be
followed by bidder Ai if only bidder Ai accepts the side-contract (these will be out-of-
equilibrium actions).
Side-contracting: P oﬀers a grand-mechanism M = {S1,S2,˜ t(·), ˜ q(·)} where Si is the
set of messages available to bidder Ai and ˜ t : S = S1 ×S2 → R2, ˜ q : S = S1 ×S2 → [0;1]2
verifying ˜ q1 + ˜ q2 ≤ 1, is a decision rule. After mechanism M is proposed by P, collusion
takes place, i.e. T proposes a collusive side-contract. At the side-contracting stage, the
revelation principle applies and we can restrict attention to direct revealing side-contracts
that are accepted by all types of all bidders. For the speciﬁcation of the strategies, a
side-contract SC contains the following elements: a function
φ : Θ1 × Θ2 → S1 × S2
that speciﬁes the messages to be sent by the bidders in M once they reported (θ1,θ2) in
SC, and two functions indexed by i = 1,2:
φi : Θj → Sj
where j 6= i. These functions φi specify the strategies to be followed by the other bidder
if bidder Ai refuses the side-contract. Those functions φ and φi may be stochastic. The
5possibilities of distortion of the outcome are characterized by the set of available distortion
functions y and k. We impose that side-transfers are balanced, i.e. y1(.,.) + y2(.,.) = 0
and k1(.,.) + k2(.,.) = 0, and that a bidder cannot stay with a negative quantity, i.e.
−ki ≤ ˜ qi. For notational simplicity, we will denote by y (resp. k) the monetary transfer
(resp. quantity reallocation) from A1 to A2. Under Technology 1, we impose in addition
that k ≡ 0. As we consider only two bidders, the distortions of the outcome available
once bidder Ai refuses the side-contract are simply the status quo.
The objective of the third-party is to maximize the (ex ante) expected sum of the
bidders’ surplus. When P oﬀers a grand-mechanism {S1,S2,˜ t(·), ˜ q(·)}. T will oﬀer a
collusive agreement that solves:5
max
y,k,φ,φi
Eθ θ1(˜ q1(φ(θ)) − k(θ)) + θ2(˜ q2(φ(θ)) + k(θ)) − ˜ t1(φ(θ)) − ˜ t2(φ(θ))
subject to
Eθj[θi(˜ qi(φ(θi,θj)) + (−1)
ik(θi,θj)) − ˜ ti(φ(θi,θj)) + (−1)
iy(θi,θj)] ≥
Eθj[θi(˜ qi(φ(˜ θi,θj))+(−1)
ik(˜ θi,θj))−˜ ti(φ(˜ θi,θj))+(−1)
iy(˜ θi,θj)]; (ICi(θi))
Eθj[θi(˜ qi(φ(θi,θj)) + (−1)




Eθj[θi˜ qi(si,φi(θj)) − ˜ ti(si,φi(θj))]}. (IRi(θi))
with y and k in the set of acceptable distortions. In particular, k ≡ 0 under Technology 1.
Those constraints are the incentive and participation constraints at the side-contracting
stage. The right hand side of the last (participation) constraint reﬂects the fact that
if bidder Ai refuses the side-contract, he can play optimally in the grand-mechanism,
knowing that the other bidder will play the punishment strategy φi(θj).
The idiosyncrasies of our approach to collusion can be stressed by a comparison with
Laﬀont and Martimort [11, 12]. Those authors develop an analysis of optimal contracting
in the presence of collusion. The key diﬀerences between their model and ours lie in the
timing and the commitment abilities of the third-party. Whereas they consider that the
third-party cannot inﬂuence the participation decisions of the bidders in the grand mech-
anism, we assume that participation decisions can be speciﬁed in the collusive agreement.
Moreover, whereas they consider that side-contracting breaks down if one bidder refuses
it, we assume that the third-party has enough commitment abilities to commit to enforce
punishments in case of non-participation of one bidder.6 This apparently minor diﬀerence
has strong implications. Their game is a sequential game of imperfect information where
beliefs have to be revised out of the equilibrium path, whereas it is not a topic in ours as
5We are interested in Bayes-Nash implementation.
6Formally, this translates into the fact that we do not put any restrictions on φi, whereas they assume
that φi can only be non-cooperative equilibrium strategies.
6what follows a deviation by one bidder is determined in the side-contract. A revision of
the beliefs is without consequences.
Therefore, there is no need to check ex post that the predictions are robust to a family
of out-of-equilibrium beliefs or to deal with the problem of suboptimality of side-contracts
that are refused in equilibrium by some types of bidders. The problem of robustness
to out-of-equilibrium beliefs is particularly sharp in our auction environment and the
commitment hypothesis we make in this paper can be seen as the modelling trick that
allows us to circumvent this problem.
3 Implementable allocations
The objective of the seller is to maximize his expected payoﬀ anticipating that the grand-
mechanism it proposes will be distorted by collusion. Let us consider a grand-mechanism
{˜ t(·), ˜ q(·)} that is followed by a side-contract {φ(·),y(·),k(·),(φi(·))i=1,2}, oﬀered in re-
sponse to this grand-mechanism. We will reason over the equilibrium allocations and
denote 7
ti(θi,θj) = ˜ ti(φ(θi,θj)) + (−1)
iy(θi,θj),
qi(θi,θj) = ˜ qi(φ(θi,θj)) + (−1)
ik(θi,θj).
We also deﬁne
ti(θi,∅) = ˜ ti(˜ si(θi),∅), qi(θi,∅) = ˜ qi(˜ si(θi),∅), ti(∅,∅) = qi(∅,∅) = ti(∅,θj) = qi(∅,θj) = 0;
where ∅ is a message in Sj corresponding to a refusal of M and ˜ si(θi) is deﬁned by
˜ si(θi) = Argmaxsiθi˜ qi(si,∅) − ˜ ti(si,∅).
We derive in the next two lemmata conditions that are necessarily satisﬁed by an
implementable allocation, i.e. by an allocation that is obtained in an equilibrium of our
game of grand-mechanism oﬀer followed by collusion. Those conditions will have a simple
interpretation in terms of coalitional virtual valuations.
Lemma 1 Under Technology 1, if an allocation {t(·),q(·)} is implementable then i), ii),
and iii) are satisﬁed with:
i) Individual incentive and participation constraints (1) to (8) hold.
7If the function φ is stochastic, then those functions t and q are deﬁned by taking the expectation
over the distribution induced by φ.
7ii) There exist 1,2,3,4 ∈ R4 that all have the same sign and such that:
(¯ θ, ¯ θ) = argmax
e θ1,e θ2
−t1(e θ1, e θ2) − t2(e θ1, e θ2) + (¯ θ + 1∆θ)q1(e θ1, e θ2) + (¯ θ + 2∆θ)q2(e θ1, e θ2), (9)
(¯ θ,θ) = argmax
e θ1,e θ2
−t1(e θ1, e θ2)−t2(e θ1, e θ2)+(¯ θ +1∆θ)q1(e θ1, e θ2)+(θ −4∆θ)q2(e θ1, e θ2), (10)
(θ, ¯ θ) = argmax
e θ1,e θ2
−t1(e θ1, e θ2)−t2(e θ1, e θ2)+(θ −3∆θ)q1(e θ1, e θ2)+(¯ θ +2∆θ)q2(e θ1, e θ2), (11)
(θ,θ) = argmax
e θ1,e θ2
−t1(e θ1, e θ2)−t2(e θ1, e θ2)+(θ −3∆θ)q1(e θ1, e θ2)+(θ −4∆θ)q2(e θ1, e θ2), (12)
where e θi ∈ Θi ∪ {∅},
iii) When one of the i deﬁned in ii) is diﬀerent from 0, further conditions must be
veriﬁed.
1 > 0 implies that constraint (2) is binding.
2 > 0 implies that constraint (4) is binding.
3 > 0 implies that (1) is binding.
4 > 0 implies that (3) is binding.
Any i < 0 implies that (2) and (4) are binding.
Lemma 2 Under Technology 2, if an allocation {t(·),q(·)} is implementable then the
same constraints as for Technology 1 must be veriﬁed, except that now constraints (9) to
(12) are replaced by the following:
{(¯ θ, ¯ θ),0} = argmaxe θ1,e θ2,k
−t1(e θ1, e θ2) − t2(e θ1, e θ2) + (¯ θ + 1∆θ)[q1(e θ1, e θ2) − k] + (¯ θ + 2∆θ)[q2(e θ1, e θ2) + k],
(13)
{(¯ θ,θ),0} = argmaxe θ1,e θ2,k
−t1(e θ1, e θ2) − t2(e θ1, e θ2) + (¯ θ + 1∆θ)[q1(e θ1, e θ2) − k] + (θ − 4∆θ)[q2(e θ1, e θ2) + k],
(14)
{(θ, ¯ θ),0} = argmaxe θ1,e θ2,k
−t1(e θ1, e θ2) − t2(e θ1, e θ2) + (θ − 3∆θ)[q1(e θ1, e θ2) − k] + (¯ θ + 2∆θ)[q2(e θ1, e θ2) + k],
(15)
{(θ,θ),0} = argmaxe θ1,e θ2,k
−t1(e θ1, e θ2) − t2(e θ1, e θ2) + (θ − 3∆θ)[q1(e θ1, e θ2) − k] + (θ − 4∆θ)[q2(e θ1, e θ2) + k].
(16)
where e θi ∈ Θi ∪ {∅}, k ∈ R, and k = 0 when e θi = ∅ for some i.
The constraints (9) to (12) (or (13) to (16) ) are the coalitional constraints that
come from equilibrium reporting of the third-party. They summarize what we can call
8the coalitional incentive constraints and the coalitional participation constraints. These
participation constraints come from the fact that the third-party must prefer equilibrium
reporting rather than asking one or two bidders to refuse the grand-mechanism. The
variables i that enter their deﬁnition can be interpreted as choice variables for P: the
seller has some degree of control over these variables through the design of an appropriate
grand-mechanism. Let us detail this point. Suppose that collusion is organized under
complete information (i.e. T is informed about the buyers’ types) then coalition incentive
and participation constraints would be written as in Lemma 1 ii), with i = 0 (i = 1,..,4).
T would not distort the reports in M if and only if telling the truth maximizes the sum
of the utilities. However, in our setting, T is not informed about the buyers’ type. Hence,
T need not be able to implement a side-contract that manipulates the reports as soon as
telling the truth does not maximize the sum of the utilities. There may be some losses due
to asymmetric information. Yet, if there were no participation constraints for the side-
contract, we know from d’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet [2] that T could still implement
eﬃcient collusion (collusion as if it were informed about the buyers’ types). When T
faces participation constraints, they may prevent it from implementing such an eﬃcient
collusion.
It is convenient to interpret those i as deﬁning the coalitional virtual valuations of
the bidders. if we ignore for one moment the individual constraints, collusion imposes
that the seller behaves as if he were facing a composite bidder (the coalition) caracterized
by its willingness to pay for the good (the coalitional virtual valuation). This willingness
to pay inﬂuences its reporting decision as well as its participation decision, leading to
the coalitional participation contraints (9) to (12) (or (13) to (16) ) . The fact that
collusion is an issue transforms the multi-agent mechanism design problem into a single-
agent mechanism design problem with the additional subtlety that the willingness to pay
of this single agent is endogenous and inﬂuenced by the design of the grand-mechanism.
One consequence of those lemmata is that it is impossible to increase the bidders’
coalitional virtual valuations in each state of nature (for instance by choosing 1 > 0,
2 > 0, 3 < 0 and 4 < 0). All the is must have the same sign. Moreover, in order to
increase the coalitional virtual valuation of the bidders, the seller P must oﬀer a grand
mechanism that binds the upward individual incentive constraint of at least one bidder.
With such a binding constraint, the third-party may not be able to implement the eﬃcient
outcome at the side-contracting stage: proposing the side-contract that maximizes the
sum of the utilities of the buyers would induce one of them to overstate his willingness to
pay. If there is no binding upward incentive constraints in an implementable allocation,
then the program of the third-party is equivalent to a relaxed program in which one
considers only downward incentive constraints. In such a case, virtual valuations are
distorted downard and the intuitive consequence is that this cannot be proﬁtable for the
9seller. The only solution to escape from this schedule is thus to bind an upward incentive
constraint.
These two lemmata also clarify the diﬀerences for the third-party and the seller be-
tween Technology 1 and Technology 2. When T can enforce reallocations of the good in
addition to monetary transfers, it faces more arbitrage opportunities. The reason why
monetary transfers and quantity reallocations are not identical tools to transfer utility
from one buyer to another is the asymmetry of marginal valuations. While marginal
utility of money is assumed constant and equal for all buyers, marginal utility of the
good is given by the private information parameter θi and may diﬀer across buyers. As a
consequence, the utility transfers obtained by mean of a reallocation cannot be replicated
through monetary transfers and vice versa. We can gain some insight on the diﬀerences
between the two technologies by drawing an analogy with monopoly pricing. Under Tech-
nology 1, P is a multiproduct monopolist because the composite agent considers that
there are two distinct goods. The initial good given to bidder A1 is diﬀerent from the
initial good given to bidder A2. Under Technology 2, this is no longer the case as the
third-party can costlessly transfer the good from one bidder to the other and the problem
of the seller is that of a single-product monopolist. This explains why under Technology 1
coalitional incentive compatibility is characterized by (9) to (12) while under Technology
2 it is characterized by (13) to (16).
Once necessary conditions for implementability are characterized, we can write a re-
laxed program for the seller P. In this program, his objective is to maximize his payoﬀ
in the set of grand-mechanisms satisfying the necessary conditions for implementability.




subject to (1) to (12) under Technology 1,
(1) to (8) and (13) to (16) under Technology 2.
At this stage, we do not know if the solution to this relaxed program is implementable.
Lemmas 1 and 2 do not characterize necessary and suﬃcient conditions for implementabil-
ity but rather give a set of necessary conditions. However, in some situations of interest,
these necessary conditions are indeed suﬃcient.
Lemma 3 If i = 0 for all i, then constraints (1) to (12) (under Technology 1) or con-
straints (1) to (8) and (13) to (16) (under Technology 2), are suﬃcient for the alloca-
tion {t,q} to be implementable via a collusion-proof grand-mechanism M, i.e. a grand-
mechanism that is not distorted through the collusion process.
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formed T would not try to distort this mechanism. It can attain its ﬁrst-best proﬁt by
proposing the null side-contract. Moreover, if the grand-mechanism satisﬁes the incentive
and participation individual constraints, the null side-contract also satisiﬁes these con-
straints. Hence, the null side-contract is the solution to the maximization program of an
uninformed T and this grand-mechanism is thus collusion-proof. When i = 0 for all i,
we can say that collusion is eﬃcient because the third-party obtains its ﬁrst-best proﬁt.
4 Eﬃciency of collusion in optimal auctions
In this section we prove that, under both technologies, collusion is eﬃcient at the optimum
for the seller.
Technology 1
In an auction in which collusion is precluded at no cost, the seller uses competition
between the buyers to decrease their rents. In such a mechanism, an underreport of one
buyer exerts a positive externality on the others because it gives them more chance to
win the auction. Collusion, by allowing the buyers to make joint underreports, partially
internalize this externality and prevents the seller from using competition so intensively.
When looking for the optimal collusion-proof mechanism, it is thus natural to concentrate
on coalition incentive and participation constraints (9) to (12) as they are certainly more
stringent than individual constraints. This is the very nature of an auction mechanism.
Thus, when designing the optimal auction, the seller P will choose the i in order to
relax as much as possible the coalition constraints. It seems that this is done by inducing
higher virtual valuations for the coalition, i.e. by choosing 1,2 ≥ 0 or 3,4 ≤ 0. In
that case, the coalition behaves as a single buyer with valuation parameters ¯ θ + 1∆θ,
¯ θ + 2∆θ, θ − 3∆θ and θ − 4∆θ. This parameters are higher than the true ones ¯ θ, ¯ θ,
θ, θ, which means that the coalition overestimates the payoﬀ of the buyers. In such a
situation, the seller should be able to extract more surplus than in a situation where the
coalition reasons over true valuations. However, P is not totally free in the choice of the
i as indicated in Lemma 1. Non-null values of the i correspond to additional constraints
concerning individual rents. These additional constraints are so demanding that it is in
fact optimal for the seller to let collusion occur under complete information, i.e. to let
virtual valuations be equal to true valuations.
Theorem 1 Under Technology 1, P optimally chooses 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 0 which
implies that collusion is eﬃcient.
This theorem highlights the strength of the collusion problem in auctions. The seller
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cause it seems that collusion under complete information is the worst thing that can hap-
pen for the seller’s payoﬀ. Accordingly, the seller should try to build a mechanism that
avoids eﬃcient collusion. Our theorem says that this cannot be done without lowering the
seller’s payoﬀ. Trying to distort collusion costs more than facing eﬃcient collusion. As a
direct implication of Theorem 1 and Lemma 3, the optimal allocation can be implemented
in a collusion-proof way.
The complete proof is given in the appendix but we give a heuristic treatment of the
reasoning hereafter. In order to increase his payoﬀ compared to the eﬃcient collusion
situation, the seller should try to increase the coalitional virtual valuations. According to
Lemma 1, this must be done by binding the upward incentive constraint of one bidder
at the side-contracting stage. This implies in turn that the participation constraint of a
θ-bidder (say bidder A1) must be binding in the side-contract. At this stage, we exploit
the fact that the third-party can enforce punishment strategies if one bidder (say bidder
A1) refuses the side-contract. Among other punishment strategies, the third-party could
impose to bidder A2 not to participate in the grand-mechanism. In this case, the utility
of a θ-bidder A1 playing alone the grand-mechanism must be at least the same as that
obtained if this θ-bidder A1 accepts the side-contract (because the corresponding partic-
ipation constraint is supposed to be binding). But that out-of-equilibrium option is also
available to the third-party when designing the optimal side-contract. The third-party
could implement a side-contract involving non-participation for one bidder. For such a
contract to be suboptimal, the grand-mechanism must satisfy what we can call some
coalitional partial participation constraints stating that the third-party should prefer to
tell the truth rather than asking one bidder to refuse the grand-mechanism and the other
to report truthfully. Binding the participation constraint of a θ-bidder is then costly for
the seller because that strenghtens these coalitional partial participation constraints. This
eﬀect is actually suﬃcient to discourage the seller from trying to distort the coalitional
virtual valuations.
According to this reasoning, the critical threat imposed by the third-party is that
of non-participation of one bidder. This threat is eﬀective because of the two central
hypothesis of our model. The ﬁrst one is the hypothesis of interim participation of the
buyers in the grand-mechanism which implies that the third-party can implement non-
participation. The second-one is that of perfect commitment of the third-party which
implies that it can implement non-participation as a response to a refusal of the side-
contract by one bidder.
Once implementability constraints have been completely characterized, it is routine to
derive the optimal proﬁt and quantity schedules.
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q1(¯ θ, ¯ θ) + q2(¯ θ, ¯ θ) = 1
q1(¯ θ,θ) = q2(θ, ¯ θ) = 1
q1(θ, ¯ θ) = q2(¯ θ,θ) = 0
q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ) = 1
The seller’s ex ante expected payoﬀ is then θ + (ν − ν2)∆θ.
If θ − ν
(1−ν)2∆θ ≤ 0, the seller prefers to exclude θ-bidders. He sells at price θ and his
proﬁt is then (1 − (1 − ν)2)θ.
One direct consequence of this corollary is that collusion is eﬀective in the sense that
the optimal collusion-proof mechanism yields lower proﬁts to the seller than the optimal
mechanism when collusion is not feasible (strictly lower if θ − ν
1−ν∆θ > 0).
Technology 2
Now, we consider the case in which the third-party can commit to reallocations of the
good in addition to the monetary transfers (Technology 2). In such a setting, necessary
conditions for implementability are given by Lemma 2. The program of the seller subject
to these coalitional constraints only is equivalent to the program of a single-product mo-
nopolist facing no production costs and selling to a consumer with an unknown willingness
to pay for the good distributed in the following way: max{θ+1∆θ;θ+2∆θ} with prob-
ability ν2; max{θ + 1∆θ;θ − 4∆θ} with probability ν(1 − ν); max{θ − 3∆θ;θ + 2∆θ}
with probability ν(1 − ν) and max{θ − 3∆θ;θ − 4∆θ} with probability (1 − ν)2. When
the value of the i is known, this monopoly pricing problem is trivial. The monopolist
may want to exclude some consumers but will sell either the quantity 0 or 1. The price
charged for 1 unit of the good will be the lowest value of the willingness to pay of the
consumers that are served.
Lemma 4 Suppose that, under Technology 2, the seller chooses i = 0 for all i and
optimizes in the corresponding set of implementable allocations. His payoﬀ is then θ if
θ −
1−(1−ν)2
(1−ν)2 ∆θ > 0 and (1 − (1 − ν)2)θ otherwise.
When i = 0 for all i, the relaxed program of the seller (subject to coalitional con-
straints only) is equivalent to that of a monopolist facing an agent whose willingness to
pay e θ is in {θ,θ} and with P(e θ = θ) = (1 − ν)2. In such a case, the payoﬀ of the seller
is θ if he decides not to exclude θ-consumers, i.e. if and only if θ −
1−(1−ν)2
(1−ν)2 ∆θ > 0 and
(1 − (1 − ν)2)θ if he decides to exclude θ-consumers. These payoﬀs can be obtained via
a contract satisfying all the necessary conditions for implementability (for instance via a
contract that speciﬁes an allocation rule and a constant unit price with which we compute
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Lemma 3 ensures that such a contract is collusion-proof. The payoﬀs identiﬁed in this
lemma are then a lower bound on what the seller can achieve under Technology 2.
Theorem 2 Under Technology 2, collusion in the optimal collusion-proof auction is eﬃ-
cient. P optimally chooses i = 0 for all i.
The formal proof is given in the appendix and is quite similar in spirit to that of
Theorem 1. Increasing the coalitional virtual valuations basically requires that the partic-
ipation constraint of a θ-bidder is binding in the side-contract. This, in turn, strengthens
the coalitional partial participation constraints of coalitions including a θ-bidder, in such
a way that the seller’s proﬁt cannot increase. Again, the central elements of the proof are
the interim participation and the perfect commitment hypothesis.
Theorems 1 and 2 are important results that characterize settings in which collusion
is eﬃcient at the optimum. In these settings, there are no transaction costs imposed
by agents’ asymmetric information at the side-contracting stage. This is in contrast with
previous results in the literature on collusion in mechanism design. Laﬀont and Martimort
[11] proved that in a public good setting, the grand-mechanism can be cleverly designed
to be collusion-proof at no additional cost. Che and Kim [5] generalize this result to a
large class of mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments. In those papers,
the principal can impose transaction costs on the side-contracting stage so that agents
are not able to collude eﬃciently. These kind of mechanisms cannot be replicated in our
setting because we consider interim participation decisions in the grand-mechanism while
those authors consider ex ante participation (i.e. participation before the collusion stage).
Our results also crucially depend on the perfect commitment hypothesis we made
concerning the third-party. Indeed, with the same timing but with the hypothesis that
the side-contract vanishes in case of refusal by one bidder, Pavlov [16] (see also Che and
Kim [6]) obtains the strikingly diﬀerent result that the second-best contract can sometimes
be implemented in a collusion-proof way. It is thus important to justify our commitment
hypothesis again here. In our view, this is an important hypothesis that brings two
beneﬁts. The ﬁrst beneﬁt is that it allows us to use the revelation principle at the side-
contracting stage without imposing ad hoc restrictions on the side-contracts. The second
beneﬁt is that it simpliﬁes the game form as every player plays only once (in equilibrium).
Out-of-equilibrium revision of beliefs is thus not an issue. To clarify this, suppose that the
side-contract vanishes after the refusal by one bidder. Then one cannot a priori restrict
attention to passive beliefs together with fully participative side-contracts. Indeed, if fully
participative (i.e. accepted by all types of all players) side-contracts are to be sustained
with passive beliefs out of the equilibrium path, then it may be proﬁtable for the third-
party to oﬀer a side-contract that excludes some bidders in order to manipulate the beliefs
14held after a refusal. As a consequence, the hypothesis that the side-contract vanishes after
the refusal by one bidder necessitates either a careful study of participation, or a close
look at every possible (or reasonable8) out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Neither solution seems
very simple in our auction setting.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to study collusion in auction settings. On a theoretical ground,
it provides an approach to collusion problems that is robust to any kind of beliefs updating.
Then it characterizes two collusion technologies that are such that collusion among bidders
is eﬃcient in the optimal mechanism for the seller. Thus it generalizes previous results
obtained in restricted classes of mechanisms. It also highlights the fact that previous
results on the existence of transaction costs (due to asymmetric information) in side-
contracting may not be robust to a natural change in the timing hypothesis. If collusion
occurs before participation in the grand-mechanism, the threat of non-participation may
be strong enough to prevent the seller from imposing transaction costs on side-contracting.
Appendix
• Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 Let us start with the case in which the third-party
cannot manipulate the allocation of the good (i.e. k ≡ 0). We will also assume for the
moment that the reservation utilities of the bidders in the side-mechanism are ﬁxed and
cannot be manipulated by T. These exogenous reservation utilities will be denoted Ui(θi).






−˜ ti(φ(θ1,θ2)) + θi˜ qi(φ(θ1,θ2))
subject to
Eθ2[−˜ t1(φ(¯ θ,θ2)) + ¯ θ˜ q1(φ(¯ θ,θ2)) − y(¯ θ,θ2)] ≥ Eθ2[−˜ t1(φ(θ,θ2)) + ¯ θ˜ q1(φ(θ,θ2)) − y(θ,θ2)]
(17)
Eθ2[−˜ t1(φ(θ,θ2)) + θ˜ q1(φ(θ,θ2)) − y(θ,θ2)] ≥ Eθ2[−˜ t1(φ(¯ θ,θ2)) + θ˜ q1(φ(¯ θ,θ2)) − y(¯ θ,θ2)]
(18)
Eθ1[−˜ t2(φ(θ1, ¯ θ)) + ¯ θ˜ q2(φ(θ1, ¯ θ)) + y(θ1, ¯ θ)] ≥ Eθ1[−˜ t2(φ(θ1,θ)) + ¯ θ˜ q2(φ(θ1,θ)) + y(θ1,θ)]
(19)
Eθ1[−˜ t2(φ(θ1,θ)) + θ˜ q2(φ(θ1,θ)) + y(θ1,θ)] ≥ Eθ1[−˜ t2(φ(θ1, ¯ θ)) + θ˜ q2(φ(θ1, ¯ θ)) + y(θ1, ¯ θ)]
(20)
8Here can intervene the notion of ratiﬁability developped by Cramton and Palfrey [7].
15Eθ2[−˜ t1(φ(¯ θ,θ2)) + ¯ θ˜ q1(φ(¯ θ,θ2)) − y(¯ θ,θ2)] ≥ U1(¯ θ) (21)
Eθ2[−˜ t1(φ(θ,θ2)) + θ˜ q1(φ(θ,θ2)) − y(θ,θ2)] ≥ U1(θ) (22)
Eθ1[−˜ t2(φ(θ1, ¯ θ)) + ¯ θ˜ q2(φ(θ1, ¯ θ)) + y(θ1, ¯ θ)] ≥ U2(¯ θ) (23)
Eθ1[−˜ t2(φ(θ1,θ)) + θ˜ q2(φ(θ1,θ)) + y(θ1,θ)] ≥ U2(θ) (24)
As we allow for stochastic manipulation functions φ, we optimize over a convex set and
Lagrangean techniques apply. Let us denote λi the Lagrange multiplier associated with
constraint (i). Optimizing with respect to y(θ1,θ2) yields:
λ17 − λ18 − λ19 + λ20 − λ22 + λ24 = 0 (25)
νλ17 − νλ18 + (1 − ν)λ19 − (1 − ν)λ20 − νλ22 + (1 − ν)λ23 = 0 (26)
−(1 − ν)λ17 + (1 − ν)λ18 − νλ19 + νλ20 − (1 − ν)λ21 + νλ24 = 0 (27)
−λ17 + λ18 + λ19 − λ20 − λ21 + λ23 = 0 (28)
Among the possible manipulations available for a (θi,θj)-coalition there are the equilib-
rium manipulations of the other coalitions (˜ θi, ˜ θj). There is also the possibility that one
or two bidders refuse M. Then the conditions stating that the manipulation φ is optimal
encompass the following :
(θ,θ) = argmaxe θ1,e θ2 −t1(e θ1, e θ2) + (θ −
λ17
ν+λ17+λ21−λ18( ν
1−ν)∆θ)q1(e θ1, e θ2)
−t2(e θ1, e θ2) + (θ −
λ19
ν+λ19+λ23−λ20( ν
1−ν)∆θ)q2(e θ1, e θ2)
.
(¯ θ,θ) = argmaxe θ1,e θ2 −t1(e θ1, e θ2) + (¯ θ +
λ18
ν+λ17+λ21−λ18∆θ)q1(e θ1, e θ2)
−t2(e θ1, e θ2) + (θ −
λ19
ν+λ19+λ23−λ20( ν
1−ν)∆θ)q2(e θ1, e θ2)
.
(θ, ¯ θ) = argmaxe θ1,e θ2 −t1(e θ1, e θ2) + (θ −
λ17
ν+λ17+λ21−λ18( ν
1−ν)∆θ)q1(e θ1, e θ2)
−t2(e θ1, e θ2) + (¯ θ +
λ20
ν+λ19+λ23−λ20∆θ)q2(e θ1, e θ2)
,
(¯ θ, ¯ θ) = argmaxe θ1,e θ2 −t1(e θ1, e θ2) + (¯ θ +
λ18
ν+λ17+λ21−λ18∆θ)q1(e θ1, e θ2)
−t2(e θ1, e θ2) + (¯ θ +
λ20








ν + λ19 + λ23 − λ20
=
λ20






















Using the fact that the λis are Lagrange multipliers, we can deduce some properties
of the is. First, as all the λis are positive, all the is must have the same sign. Next,
161 6= 0 implies that λ18 is diﬀerent from zero, so (2) should be binding.
2 6= 0 implies that λ20 is diﬀerent from zero, so (4) should be binding.
3 6= 0 implies that λ17 is diﬀerent from zero, so (1) should be binding.
4 6= 0 implies that λ19 is diﬀerent from zero, so (3) should be binding.
Finally, any i < 0 implies that λ17 + λ21 − λ18 < 0 which has two consequences: λ18
should be strictly positive so that (2) should be binding and, because (28) holds, λ20 should
be diﬀerent from zero, so (4) should be binding. Thus, the conditions stated in Lemma 1
are necessary for the ﬁnal allocation to be a solution of the third-party program when it
cannot control the punishment strategies φ1 and φ2. When the third-party controls the
punishment strategies, the conditions for optimality are more stringent but the conditions
i), ii) and iii) are still necessary.
The proof of Lemma 2 follows exactly the same lines except that one must take into
account the fact that, under Technology 2, T can manipulate the allocation of the good
by using the function k. It is thus necessary to take this function k into account both in
the objective function of the third-party and in the individual incentive and participation
constraints of the bidders.
• Proof of Lemma 3: Consider a grand-mechanism that satisﬁes the coalitional con-
straints (constraints (1) to (12) under Technology 1 or constraints (1) to (8) and (13)
to (16) under Technology 2) for i = 0 for all i. In such a case, the null side-contract
maximizes the (unconstrained) objective function of the third-party. If in addition, the
individual incentive and participation constraints hold, the null side-contract is incen-
tive compatible at the side-contracting stage and accepted by everybody. Thus it is the
solution to the maximization program of the third-party.
• Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1: Let us start by considering the maximization
program when 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 0. We will reason over quantities q and rents u = θq−t.
The relaxed program can be written (we write only the relevant constraints):
max
q(.),u(.)
Eθ1×θ2[θ1q1(θ1,θ2) + θ2q2(θ1,θ2) − u1(θ1,θ2) − u2(θ1,θ2)]
subject to
u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) ≥ 0 (29)
u1(θ, ¯ θ) + u2(θ, ¯ θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) + ∆θq2(θ,θ) (30)
u1(¯ θ,θ) + u2(¯ θ,θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) + ∆θq1(θ,θ) (31)
u1(¯ θ, ¯ θ) + u2(¯ θ, ¯ θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) + ∆θq2(θ,θ) + ∆θq1(θ,θ) (32)
All these constraints are binding at the optimum. Then we can compute the optimal
quantities and aggregate rents and check that the other constraints can be satisﬁed. The
17solution given in the corollary is a solution of the fully constrained program when P
chooses to set i = 0.
We now prove that it is optimal to set i = 0. We consider the necessary conditions
given in Lemma 1 and present the proof through a series of claims.We restrict attention
to cases where θ − ν
1−ν∆θ ≥ 0 as in the other cases, the second-best schedule is obviously
collusion-proof and can be implemented with i = 0.
Claim 1: An optimal choice of i necessarily entails 1 ≥ 0,2 = 0,3 = 0,4 ≥ 0,
with 4 = 0 when 1 = 0 (or its symmetric counterpart).
Proof : Suppose ﬁrst that 1 > 0 and 2 > 0, or i < 0 for some i, so that the individual
incentive constraints of θ-buyers (2) and (4) are binding. Consider the maximization
program of the seller subject to individual participation constraints (6) and (8) ((2) and
(4) being binding). We can compute a lower bound for the expected rent left to the
buyers:
Eθ1×θ2u1 + u2 ≥ ν
2∆θ(q1(¯ θ, ¯ θ) + q2(¯ θ, ¯ θ)) + ν(1 − ν)∆θ(q1(¯ θ,θ)) + q2(θ, ¯ θ)).
Replacing in the objective function gives the following upper bound for the seller’s surplus:
Eθ1×θ2[θq1(θ1,θ2) + θq2(θ1,θ2)].
This is lower than θ: the expected payoﬀ of the seller is lower than when i = 0.
Now, we consider the case 3 > 0 or 4 > 0 and 1 = 2 = 0 (and 3 ≥ 0, 4 ≥ 0) . In
this situation, the relevant coalitional constraints are
u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) − 3∆θq1(θ,θ) − 4∆θq2(θ,θ) ≥ 0 (33)
u1(θ, ¯ θ) + u2(θ, ¯ θ) − 3∆θq1(θ, ¯ θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) − 3∆θq1(θ,θ) + ∆θq2(θ,θ) (34)
u1(¯ θ,θ) + u2(¯ θ,θ) − 4∆θq2(¯ θ,θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) + ∆θq1(θ,θ) − 4∆θq2(θ,θ) (35)
u1(¯ θ, ¯ θ) + u2(¯ θ, ¯ θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) + ∆θq2(θ,θ) + ∆θq1(θ,θ) (36)
From this constraints, we can compute a lower bound on the rent that must be let to
the two bidders. This lower bound (which is attained in the optimum in the case of
3 = 4 = 0) is an increasing function of 3 and 4. Thus choosing 3 and 4 strictly
positive cannot increase the payoﬀ of the seller.
Suppose that 1 > 0, 2 = 0 and 3 > 0. In that case, the two incentive constraints of
bidder A1 are binding. Therefore the q1 schedule must verify νq1(θ,θ)+(1−ν)q1(θ,θ) =
νq1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ). If we concentrate now on the coalition incentive constraints
given in Lemma 1, the fact that a (θ,θ)-coalition should prefer equilibrium reporting
rather than pretending to be a (θ,θ)-coalition and that a (θ,θ)-coalition should prefer
18equilibrium reporting rather than pretending to be a (θ,θ)-coalition, taken together imply
that q1(θ,θ) ≥ q1(θ,θ). Similarly, we can show that we must have q1(θ,θ) ≥ q1(θ,θ). From
these relations, we can deduce that if the two incentive constraints are binding for bidder
A1, then necessarily q1(.,.) = q1 is a constant. Consider now the optimization program of
the seller subject to this constraint on the quantity sold to bidder A1 and to the downward
incentive constraint for bidder A2 and (low type) participation constraints of both bidders.
The proﬁt of the seller is given by:
θq1 + ν
2θq2(θ,θ) + ν(1 − ν)θq2(θ,θ)
+ν(1 − ν)(θ −
ν
1 − ν





Provided θ − ν
1−ν∆θ ≥ 0, this is always lower than θ. 
Claim 2: When 1 > 0, 2 = 0, 3 = 0, the upward incentive constraint of bidder
A1 together with the participation constraint of a θ-bidder A1 must be binding in the
side-contract. Moreover, coalitional virtual valuations verify 1 < 1−ν
ν .
Proof: Suppose that 1 > 0, 2 = 0, 3 = 0 and 4 ≥ 0. In that case, because λ20 = 0
and λ17 = 0, equation (28) implies λ19 + λ23 = λ21 − λ18. Hence λ18 > 0 implies that
λ21 > 0 so that the participation constraint of a θ-bidder A1 must be binding in the
side-contract. Moreover equation (26) gives that λ19 + λ23 ≥ ν
1−νλ18. This allows us to











Claim 3: When the upward incentive constraint of bidder A1 together with the
participation constraint of a θ-bidder A1 are binding in the side-contract, the coalitional
partial participation constraints prevent the seller from achieving a higher payoﬀ than
with i = 0, for all i.
Proof: We exploit the fact that the participation constraint of a θ-bidder A1 is binding
in the side-contract to derive a lower bound on the rent left to the bidders. One possible
strategy of the third-party at the collusion stage is to oblige bidder A2 not to participate in
the auction in case bidder A1 refuses the side-contract. As the corresponding participation
constraint is binding, this cannot lower the utility of a θ-bidder A1. The grand-mechanism
must be such that
θq1(θ,∅) − t1(θ,∅) ≥ νu1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)u1(θ,θ) ≥ ∆θ(νq1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ)).
Moreover, we must ensure that no coalition of bidders prefer announcing (˜ s1(θ),∅) rather
than telling the truth. For a (θ,θ)-coalition, this implies that
(θ + 1∆θ)q1(θ,θ) − t1(θ,θ) + (θ − 4∆θ)q2(θ,θ) − t2(θ,θ) ≥ (θ + 1∆θ)q1(θ,∅) − t1(θ,∅);
19and for a (θ,θ)-coalition:
θq1(θ,θ) − t1(θ,θ) + (θ − 4∆θ)q2(θ,θ) − t2(θ,θ) ≥ θq1(θ,∅) − t1(θ,∅).
We call these constraints the coalitional partial participation constraints.
We will reason over the coalitional constraints exclusively. We will decompose the
analysis into two subcases (Case A and Case B), depending on the ranking of q1(θ,θ) and
νq1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ).
Case A : Suppose that q1(θ,θ) ≤ νq1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ). In order to solve the
optimization program of the seller we ﬁrst neglect the partial participation constraint of a
(θ,θ)-coalition. A lower bound on the expected rent left to the third-party can be derived
by considering the partial participation constraint of a (θ,θ)-coalition, the participation
constraint of a (θ,θ)-coalition, the downward incentive constraint of a (θ,θ)-coalition and
the global downward incentive constraint of a (θ,θ)-coalition (i.e. corresponding to a lie
(θ,θ)). The lower bound is then:
ν(1 + 4)∆θq2(θ,θ) + ν
2(1 + 1)∆θq1(θ,θ)
+ν(1 − ν)[∆θ(νq1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ)) + 1∆θq1(θ,∅)].
It is correct to neglect the partial participation constraint of a (θ,θ)-coalition only if
q1(θ,∅) ≥ νq1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ). When this latter condition is not veriﬁed, a lower
bound can be derived by considering the same set of constraints except that the partic-
ipation constraint of a (θ,θ)-coalition is replaced by its partial participation constraint.
The corresponding rent is then:
ν(1 + 4)∆θq2(θ,θ) + ν
2(1 + 1)∆θq1(θ,θ)
+∆θ(νq1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ)) − (1 − ν(1 − ν) − 1ν(1 − ν))∆θq1(θ,∅).
As 1 < 1−ν
ν , this expression is decreasing with q1(θ,∅); we can thus deduce that a lower
bound for the rent left to the third-party is given by:
ν(1+4)∆θq2(θ,θ)+ν
2(1+1)∆θq1(θ,θ)+ν(1−ν)(1+1)∆θ(νq1(θ,θ)+(1−ν)q1(θ,θ)).
And the proﬁt of the seller is bounded above by:
ν
2[(θ − (1 − ν)∆θ + ν1∆θ)q1(θ,θ) + θq2(θ,θ)]
+ν(1 − ν)[(θ − (1 − ν)∆θ + ν1∆θ)q1(θ,θ) + (θ − 4∆θ)q2(θ,θ)]




(1 − ν)2 ∆θ)q1(θ,θ) + (θ − 4∆θ −
ν(1 + 4)
(1 − ν)2 ∆θ)q2(θ,θ).
20This proﬁt is decreasing with 4 so we can restrict our attention to the case 4 = 0. If
θ − ν
(1−ν)2∆θ < θ −
ν2(1+1)
(1−ν)2 ∆θ < 0 then at the optimum q1(θ,θ) = q2(θ,θ) = 0 and the
seller’s proﬁt is lower than (1 − (1 − ν)2)θ. If θ −
ν2(1+1)
(1−ν)2 ∆θ ≥ 0 then the upper bound
is maximized for q1(θ,θ) = νq1(θ,θ)+(1−ν)q1(θ,θ). We further decompose the analysis
into two subcases.
• If θ − ν
(1−ν)2∆θ ≥ 0, then the upper bound is maximized for q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ) = 1.
Replacing in the upper bound and performing a pointwise maximization, we ﬁnd that the
proﬁt of the seller is lower than θ + (ν − ν2)∆θ, which is attained for i = 0.
• If θ − ν
(1−ν)2∆θ < 0, the upper bound is maximized for q2(θ,θ) = 0. Replacing in
the upper bound and performing a pointwise maximization, we ﬁnd that the proﬁt of the
seller is lower than (1 − (1 − ν)2)θ , which is attained for i = 0.
Case B : Suppose now that q1(θ,θ) ≥ νq1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ).
A lower bound on the expected rent left to the third-party can be derived by consid-
ering the participation constraint of a (θ,θ)-coalition, the downward incentive constraints
of a (θ,θ)-coalition and of a (θ,θ)-coalition and the global downward incentive constraint
of a (θ,θ)-coalition (i.e. corresponding to a lie (θ,θ)). The lower bound is then:
ν(1 + 1)∆θq1(θ,θ) + ν(1 + 4)∆θq2(θ,θ).
The corresponding proﬁt for the seller is:
ν
2[(θ + 1∆θ)q1(θ,θ) + θq2(θ,θ)] + ν(1 − ν)[(θ + 1∆θ)q1(θ,θ) + (θ − 4∆θ)q2(θ,θ)]




(1 − ν)2 ∆θ)q1(θ,θ) + (θ − 4∆θ −
ν(1 + 4)
(1 − ν)2 ∆θ)q2(θ,θ).
This proﬁt is decreasing in 4 so we can restrict our attention to the case 4 = 0. We then
face two cases depending on the value of the parameter θ − ν
(1−ν)2∆θ.
• If θ − ν
(1−ν)2∆θ ≥ 0, then the upper bound for the seller’s proﬁt is maximized when
q2(θ,θ) = 1 − q1(θ,θ) and the constraint q1(θ,θ) ≥ νq1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ) is binding.
Replacing in the upper bound and performing a pointwise maximization gives that the
seller’s proﬁt is lower than θ − (ν − ν2)∆θ, which is what the seller obtains for i = 0.
• If θ − ν
(1−ν)2∆θ < 0, then the upper bound for the seller’s proﬁt is maximized when
q2(θ,θ) = 0 and the constraint q1(θ,θ) ≥ νq1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ) is binding. Replacing
in the upper bound and performing a pointwise maximization gives that the seller’s proﬁt
is lower than (1 − (1 − ν)2)θ, which is what the seller obtains for i = 0. 
• Proof of Lemma 4: When i = 0, the coalitional constraints given in Lemma 2 imply
in particular that:
u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) ≥ 0,
21u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) + ∆θ(q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ)),
u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) + ∆θ(q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ)),
u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) + ∆θ(q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ)).
Let us consider the solution of the relaxed program of the seller subject to these four
constraints only. The total rent left to the bidders is given by (1−(1−ν)2)∆θ(q1(θ,θ)+
q2(θ,θ)). Depending on the value of θ −
1−(1−ν)2
(1−ν)2 ∆θ, the seller decides whether to exclude
the (θ,θ)-coalition from trade and obtains the payoﬀs described in the lemma. Moreover,
it is obvious that such quantity and rent schedules can be implemented in a collusion-proof
way.
• Proof of Theorem 2: From the analysis in the no-reallocation case, we already know
that if the seller is obliged to bind the upward incentive constraints of both bidders in
the grand-mechanism, then he cannot expect a proﬁt greater than θ. Thus this cannot be
proﬁtable for him. This ensures that choosing i < 0 for some i is dominated by i = 0.
Identically, choosing simultaneously 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 is dominated.
Suppose that P chooses 1 = 2 = 0 and 3 > 0 and/or 4 > 0. The coalitional
constraints given in Lemma 2 imply in particular that:
u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) − 3∆θq1(θ,θ) − 4∆θq2(θ,θ) ≥ 0,
u1(θ,θ)+u2(θ,θ)−4∆θq2(θ,θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ)+u2(θ,θ)+∆θ(q1(θ,θ)+q2(θ,θ))−4∆θq2(θ,θ),
u1(θ,θ)+u2(θ,θ)−3∆θq1(θ,θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ)+u2(θ,θ)+∆θ(q1(θ,θ)+q2(θ,θ))−3∆θq1(θ,θ),
u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) ≥ u1(θ,θ) + u2(θ,θ) + ∆θ(q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ)).
From these constraints, we can compute a lower bound on the rent that the seller must let
to the bidders. Similarly to what we proved for Theorem 1, this lower bound is actually
attained for i = 0 (see the proof of Lemma 4) and is increasing in 3 and 4. Thus the
seller cannot beneﬁt from a choice of 3 > 0 or 4 > 0.
Finally, suppose that the seller chooses 1 > 0 and 2 = 0 (the reasoning would be
exactly the same for 1 = 0 and 2 > 0). We have to decompose the treatment into several
subcases.
We restrict attention to situations where θ − ν
1−ν∆θ ≥ 0 because in other situations,
the second-best is collusion-proof and can be implmented with i = 0 (see Lemma 4). We
will consider two cases depending on whether λ17 is diﬀerent from zero (so that (1) is
binding) or not.
• If λ17 > 0, then the two incentive constraints of bidder A1 are binding in the
grand-mechanism (the upward one is binding because 1 > 0 and the downward one is
binding because λ17 > 0). This has the following consequence on the quantity schedule:
22νq1(θ,θ)+(1−ν)q1(θ,θ) = νq1(θ,θ)+(1−ν)q1(θ,θ). Moreover, the coalitional constraints
derived in Lemma 2 imply that we must have:
q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ) = q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ) ≥ q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ) ≥ q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ).
These (in)equalities come from the fact that the third-party is actually a composite agent
with a one-dimensional ordered characteristic e θ ∈ {θ+1∆θ;θ;max(θ−3∆θ,θ−4∆θ)}.
An implementable quantity schedule is thus necessarily monotonic in the characteristic.
We can even be more precise, use the fact that the third-party must not have some
arbitrage opportunities to reallocate the good and obtain that
q2(θ,θ) = q2(θ,θ) = q1(θ,θ) = 0.
If we plug these results into the condition on the individual quantity schedule of bidder
A1 obtained above, we get:
q1(θ,θ) = q1(θ,θ) = (1 − ν)q1(θ,θ) ≤ (1 − ν). (37)
Then let us use again the fact that the upward incentive constraint of bidder A1 is binding
in the grand-mechanism. Together with the participation constraint of a θ-bidder A1,
this requires that νu1(¯ θ, ¯ θ) + (1 − ν)u1(¯ θ,θ) ≥ ν∆θq1(¯ θ, ¯ θ) + (1 − ν)∆θq1(¯ θ,θ). We can
then write the following lower bound for the rent that must be given to the bidders:
Eθ1×θ2u ≥ ν2∆θq1(¯ θ, ¯ θ)+ν(1−ν)∆θq1(¯ θ,θ). If we plug this lower bound into the objective
function of the seller, we get the following upper bound for the seller’s proﬁt:
ν
2θq1(θ,θ) + ν(1 − ν)θq1(θ,θ) + ν(1 − ν)θq2(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)
2θ(q1(θ,θ) + q2(θ,θ)).
Equation (37) together with the hypothesis that θ − ν
1−ν∆θ > 0 gives that this upper
bound is below θ. Thus in that case, the seller prefers to set i = 0 for all i.
• Suppose now that λ17 = 0. In that case, as we showed in the proof of Theorem 1,
the participation constraint of a θ-bidder A1 must be binding in the side-contract, 3 = 0
and 1 < 1−ν
ν .
From the maximizing behavior of the third-party we can deduce that q1(θ,θ) =
q1(θ,θ) = q(θ + 1∆θ), because in each case the third-party behaves as a composite
agent with valuation θ + 1∆θ. Using that result in the upward incentive constraint of
bidder A1 gives:
νu1(θ,θ) + (1 − ν)u1(θ,θ) ≥ ∆θq(θ + 1∆θ).
At the collusion stage, the third-party must not be able to lower the reservation utility
of a θ-bidder A1 even though it imposes to bidder A2 not to participate in the grand-
mechanism. We can deduce from that point that in case bidder A2 refuses to participate,
23the grand-mechanism must propose to bidder A1 a transfer t(θ,∅) and a quantity q(θ,∅)
such that
θq(θ,∅) − t(θ,∅) ≥ ∆θq(θ + 1∆θ).
But it turns out that this out-of-equilibrium option also constrains the coalitional rents
that have to be let to the third-party, in particular that of a θ-composite consumer because
if a coalition decides to report (θ,∅) it obtains (t(θ,∅),q(θ,∅)).
Let us focus now on the coalitional incentive and participation constraints, and con-
sider the relaxed program of the seller subject to the coalitional partial participation
constraint of a θ-composite agent, the downward incentive constraint of a (θ + 1∆θ)-
composite agent and the upward incentive constraint of a θ-bidder. We can write the
following lower bound for the rent left to the third-party (quantities are denoted as func-
tions of the willingness to pay of the composite consumer):
ν(1∆θq(θ)+∆θq(θ+1∆θ))+ν(1−ν)∆θq(θ+1∆θ)+(1−ν)
2[∆θq(θ+1∆θ)−∆θq(θ)];












Because 1 < 1−ν
ν and q(θ + 1∆θ) > q(θ) > q(θ), this upper bound is lower than θ.
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